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Article 
On the Right to External Self-
Determination: “Selfistans,” Secession, and 
the Great Powers’ Rule+ 
Milena Sterio* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The notion of self-determination is not novel in modern 
international law.  It stems back to the beginning of the 20th 
century, when world leaders in the wake of World War I 
realized that national peoples, groups with a shared ethnicity, 
language, culture, and religion, should be allowed to decide their 
fate—thus, to self-determine their affiliation and status on the 
world scene.1  The same idea applied later in the same century 
to colonial peoples, and by the 1960s, it became widely accepted 
that oppressed colonized groups ought to have similar rights to 
 
+ I respectfully borrow the term “selfistan” from novelist Salman Rushdie, who wrote 
(sarcastically) in Shalimar the Clown, “Why not just stand still and draw a circle 
round your feet and name that Selfistan?”  SALMAN RUSHDIE, SHALIMAR THE CLOWN 
102 (2005).  I believe that Rushdie may have been incredibly prophetic in some 
respects: some groups (“peoples”) seem to be able to form their “selfistans” with the 
support of the most powerful nations (the “Great Powers”) on our planet.  This 
article attempts to decipher who such peoples are, and why their struggles are 
viewed as legitimate and deserving of independence and statehood, while others 
have been denied the same quests. 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.  J.D., Cornell Law 
School, magna cum laude, 2002; Maitrise en Droit (French law degree), Université 
Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, cum laude, 2002; D.E.A. (master’s degree), Private 
International Law, Université Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, cum laude, 2003; B.A., 
Rutgers University, French Literature and Political Science, summa cum laude, 
1998.  The author would like to thank Ekaterina Zabalueva for her invaluable 
assistance with the research and writing of this article. 
 1. See, e.g., Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: 
“Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver”?  Revolutionary International Legal Theory or 
Return to Rule by the Great Powers?, 10 UCLA J. INT’L. L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 387–
88 (2005) (describing the evolving philosophy of self-determination in the wake of 
World War I, as articulated by leaders like Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin). 
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auto-regulate and to choose their political and possibly 
sovereign status.2  However, as decades passed by and as 
separatist minority groups throughout the world began 
challenging the concept of state territorial integrity, it became 
clear that the notion of self-determination had to be somehow 
confined.3  Thus, courts and scholars came up with two different 
forms of self-determination: internal and external.4  The former 
potentially applies to all peoples, and signifies that all peoples 
should have a set of respected rights within their central state.5  
Minority groups should have cultural, social, political, linguistic, 
and religious rights and those rights should be respected by the 
mother state.  As long as those rights are respected by the 
mother state, the “people” is not oppressed and does not need to 
challenge the territorial integrity of its mother state.6  The 
latter form of self-determination applies to oppressed peoples, 
whose basic rights are not being respected by the mother state 
and who are often subject to heinous human rights abuses.7  
Such oppressed peoples, in theory, have a right to external self-
determination, which includes a right to remedial secession and 
 
 2. See Joshua Castellino, Territorial Integrity and the “Right” to Self-
Determination: An Examination of the Conceptual Tools, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 503, 
557 (2008) (describing the “wave of decolonization” in the second part of the 20th 
century, which involved several self-determination options for the decolonized 
people). 
 3. Scholars have already noted that the self-determination rhetoric has been 
of limited utility to most non-colonial oppressed peoples and that it has not helped 
such groups in their territorial claims and quests.  Id. at 556–59 (noting that the 
concept of self-determination has had “limited utility in determining the fate of the 
territory historically inhabited by people of a nation or ethnie,” because the right to 
self-determination “offers little remedy to the dispossession of land.”).  This implies 
that the right to self-determination seems at odds with the territorial integrity of 
any state or region. 
 4. See, e.g., In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.) 
(distinguishing between rights to internal versus external self-determination for the 
Quebecois within Canada); The Aaland Islands Question: Report Submitted to the 
Council of the League of Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs, League of 
Nations Doc. B7/21/68/106 (1921) [hereinafter Aaland Islands Report] (deciding that 
the Aalanders, a small island group belonging to Finland and seeking to reunite 
with Sweden, had the right to cultural and ethnic autonomy, but not the right to 
separate from Finland); Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Judicial 
Underpinnings, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 373, 379 (2003) (noting the different 
forms of self-determination available to a people, which include autonomy, self-
government, free association, and ultimately, secession). 
 5. See In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). 
 6. Id.; see also Aaland Islands Report, supra note 4. 
 7. See In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.); see also Aaland 
Islands Report, supra note 4 (concluding that the Aalanders would have the right to 
separate from Finland only if Finland disrespected their cultural rights). 
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independence.8 
In theory, the distinction between internal versus external 
self-determination is easy to draw, and a scholar or a judge 
should have no difficulty deciding which minority groups should 
accrue the more drastic right to external self-determination.  
Simply look to the human rights record of the mother state, and 
if the record shows violations, then the minority group should be 
allowed to separate.  In reality, the distinction is very difficult to 
draw.  Numerous minority groups around the globe have been 
mistreated and have asserted their rights to external self-
determination, only to find themselves rebuffed by the world 
community.9  On the other hand, some minority groups have 
found strong support in the eyes of external actors and have 
garnered sufficient international recognition to be allowed to 
separate.10  Why?  What is so unique about some minority 
groups and about their quests for independence that would 
justify the authorization to remedially secede?  When exactly—
under what circumstances—does the right to external self-
determination accrue? 
In order to answer these complex questions, this Article will 
discuss, in Part II, the notion of self-determination, its history, 
and its recent applications.  In Part III, this Article will describe 
how the theory of self-determination is linked to other 
international law concepts, such as statehood, recognition, 
sovereignty, and intervention.  In Part IV, this Article will focus 
on several case studies to illustrate the discrepancy of results 
attached to the self-determination struggles by different 
peoples.  This Article will describe the self-determination quests 
of East Timor,11 Kosovo, Chechnya, South Ossetia, and 
 
 8. Scharf, supra note 4, at 381 (noting that modern-day international law has 
embraced the right of non-colonial people to secede from their mother state “when 
the group is collectively denied civil and political rights and subject to egregious 
abuses.”). 
 9. Castellino, supra note 2, at 557–59 (noting the limited value of self-
determination rhetoric to some minority groups). 
 10. Successful examples of self-determination where minority groups were able 
to exercise their right to remedial secession include Kosovo, East Timor, Eritrea, 
Bangladesh, and the Baltic Republics.  See Milena Sterio, The Kosovar Declaration 
of Independence: “Botching the Balkans” or Respecting International Law?, 37 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 267, 275 (2009); see also JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & 
DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 112 (2d ed. 2006). 
 11. As discussed in Part IV.A, East Timor gained independence in 2002.  At 
that time, the state’s preferred English name became the Democratic Republic of 
Timor-Leste.  However, because this Article refers to time periods both pre and post 
independence, I use the term East Timor for ease of reference.  See CENTRAL 
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Abkhazia, and will show that while the first two entities 
achieved external self-determination, the latter three did not.  
Finally, in Part V, this Article will argue that each self-
determination seeking entity needs to meet four different 
criteria in order to have its quest validated by the international 
community.  These four criteria include a showing by the 
relevant people that it has been oppressed, that its central 
government is relatively weak, that it has been administered by 
some international organization or group, and that it has 
garnered the support of the most powerful states on our planet.  
This Article will conclude by positing that the fourth criterion is 
the most crucial one: that any self-determination seeking group 
must obtain the support of the most powerful states, which I 
(and other scholars) refer to as the “Great Powers.”  It is the 
Great Powers’ support, or lack thereof, that determines the fate 
of numerous peoples on our planet struggling to gain 
independence.  This Article will posit that the right to external 
self-determination accrues for different peoples if and when the 
Great Powers decide to recognize those peoples’ causes.  
Ultimately, this Article will argue that such a result is 
unfortunate, as it inappropriately mixes the legal with the 
political realms, and that any rule by the Great Powers 
inherently challenges the notion of state sovereignty and 
equality. 
II.  NOTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
The principle of self-determination has a long history and 
has been used and discussed throughout the 20th century.  It 
has evolved to a norm of customary international law, and its 
contours represent a wide-ranging spectrum of alternatives for 
the minority group seeking to self-determine its fate.12  Thus, 
self-determination rights for a minority group may involve 
simply political and representative rights within a central state, 
on the one hand, or may amount to remedial secession and 
ultimately independence on the other.13 
 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2009 (2009), available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tt.html. 
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
 13. Id. 
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A.  HISTORY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
Self-determination in international law is the legal right for 
a “people”14 to attain a certain degree of autonomy from its 
sovereign.15  As early as 1918–19, leaders like Vladimir Lenin 
and Woodrow Wilson advanced the philosophy of self-
determination: the former based on violent secession to liberate 
people from bourgeois governments, and the latter based on the 
free will of people through democratic processes.16  Today, the 
principle of self-determination is embodied in multiple 
international treaties and conventions,17 and has “crystallized 
into a rule of customary international law, applicable to and 
binding on all states.”18 
 
 14. Although the term “people” is ambiguous and vague under international 
law, it typically refers to “people who live within the same state . . . or people 
organized into a state.”  Zejnullah Gruda, Some Key Principles for a Lasting Solution 
of the Status of Kosova: Uti Possedetis, The Ethnic Principle, and Self-
Determination, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 353, 367 (2005).  Thus, “people” is a legal 
rather than natural category.  Id.  Moreover, the term “people” has been purposely 
left undefined in international law, because if the right to self-determination were to 
be applied broadly to all conceivable groups, this could destabilize states and cause 
peace and security problems.  Bartram S. Brown, Human Rights, Sovereignty, and 
the Final Status of Kosovo, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 235, 249 (2005). 
 15. The principle of self-determination was first elevated to the international 
plane by President Woodrow Wilson, who included it in his infamous Fourteen 
Points.  President Woodrow Wilson, Address Before the League of Nations to 
Enforce Peace (May 27, 1916), in CONG. REC. 8854 (May 29, 1916); see also Scharf, 
supra note 4, at 378.  For a full discussion of the principle of self-determination, see 
Gruda, supra note 14, at 369–82. 
 16. Kelly, supra note 1, at 387–88. 
 17. The term “self-determination” stems from Article 1 of the United Nations 
Charter, which speaks of the “principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples.”  U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.  Subsequent declarations voted by the U.N. 
General Assembly also refer to the term “self-determination.”  See, e.g., Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 
(XV), ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/64 (Dec. 24, 1960) (“All peoples have the right to self-
determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”); Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 
(XXV), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/64 (Oct. 24, 1970) (“The establishment of a sovereign and 
independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or 
the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people 
constitutes modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people.”). 
 18. Scharf, supra note 4, at 378; see also Legal Consequences for States of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 
31–32 (June 21); Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31–33 (Oct. 16); Frontier Dispute 
(Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 566–67 (Dec. 22); East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 
1995 I.C.J. 90, 265–68 (June 30). 
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Under the principle of self-determination, a group with a 
common identity and link to a defined territory is entitled to 
decide its political future in a democratic fashion.19  For a group 
to be entitled to exercise its collective right to self-
determination, it must qualify as a “people.”20  Traditionally, a 
two-part test has been applied to determine when a group 
qualifies as a people.21  The first prong of the test is objective 
and seeks to determine to what extent the group members 
“share a common racial background, ethnicity, language, 
religion, history, and cultural heritage,” as well as the 
“territorial integrity of the area the group is claiming.”22  The 
second prong of the test is subjective and examines “the extent 
to which individuals within the group self-consciously perceive 
themselves collectively as a distinct ‘people,’” and “the degree to 
which the group can form a viable political entity.”23 
Once the determination has been made that a specific group 
qualifies as a people and thus has the right to self-
determination, the relevant inquiry becomes whether the right 
to self-determination creates a right to secession and 
independence.24  As mentioned above, the right to self-
determination can take forms that are less intrusive on state 
sovereignty than secession.25  Self-determination can be 
effectuated in different ways: self-government, autonomy, free 
association, or, in extreme cases, independence.  
Understandably, the international community views secession 
with suspicion,26 and traditionally, the right to independence or 
 
 19. Scharf, supra note 4, at 379. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.  Note however that the term “people” has been purposely left undefined 
under international law and that the tests seeking to determine when a group 
qualifies as a people have been flexibly applied.  See supra note 14. 
 22. Scharf, supra note 4, at 379. 
 23. Id. 
 24. “Secession” under international law refers to separation of a portion of an 
existing state, whereby the separating entity either seeks to become a new state or 
to join yet another state, and whereby the original state remains in existence 
without the seceded territory.  Successful secessions around the globe have been 
rare because secession seems inherently at odds with the principles of state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, which have been core values of international 
law for centuries.  DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 112. 
 25. Scharf, supra note 4, at 379. 
 26. Id. at 380 (noting that secession is “synonymous with the dismemberment 
of states”).  Note the 1970 statement by then U.N. Secretary-General U. Thant: 
As far as the question of secession of a particular section of a State is 
concerned, the United Nations attitude is unequivocal.  As an international 
organization, the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept 
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secession as a mode of self-determination has only applied to 
people under colonial domination or some kind of oppression.27  
However, modern-day international law has come to embrace 
the right of non-colonial people to secede from an existing state, 
“when the group is collectively denied civil and political rights 
and subject to egregious abuses.”28  This right has become 
known as the “remedial” right to secession and has its origin in 
the 1920 Aaland Islands case.29 
The Aaland Islands were a small island nation situated 
between Finland and Sweden, belonging to the former and 
seeking to reunite with the latter.30  The Aalanders claimed that 
they were ethnically Swedish, and that they wished to break off 
from Finland and to become a part of Sweden.31  In an advisory 
opinion, the second Commission of Rapporteurs operating 
within the auspices of the League of Nations held, first, that 
this issue was properly of international, not domestic 
jurisdiction, and second, that the Aalanders had a right to a 
cultural autonomy, which had to be exercised within Finland.32  
Only if Finland disrespected their ethnic and cultural autonomy 
would the Aalanders’ right to separate from Finland be 
 
and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of 
its Member States. 
Secretary-General’s Press Conferences, U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., Feb. 1970, at 34, 36. 
 27. Scharf, supra note 4, at 380.  Note that under this view, the independence 
of a colony was not considered secession, because that term referred only to the 
separation from a state of a portion of its domestic territory.  Id.  Moreover, the 
international community has also leaned on the theory of “salt-water colonialism,” 
under which self-determination only applies to lands separated from the 
metropolitan mother state by oceans or seas.  Id. 
 28. Id. at 381. 
 29. Id. 
 30. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 118–19. 
 31. Id. at 119. 
 32. The League of Nations created an International Committee of Jurists to 
determine whether the League of Nations had jurisdiction over this issue and the 
Committee’s report generally held that the League of Nations had such jurisdiction.  
Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the 
League of Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal 
Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations Official Journal, Special 
Supp. No. 3, at 5–10 (1920).  Then, the League of Nations appointed a Commission 
of Rapporteurs to recommend a solution to the Aaland Islands problem, and the 
Rapporteurs report held that “separation of a minority from the State of which it 
forms a part and its incorporation in another State can only be considered as an 
altogether exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks either the will or 
the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees.”  Aaland Islands Report, 
supra note 4, at 28. 
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triggered.33 
Similarly, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations preconditions 
the right of non-colonial people to separate from an existing 
state on the denial of the right to a democratic self-government 
by the mother state.34  A similar clause, striking a balance 
between the right to self-determination and territorial integrity, 
was inserted in the 1993 Vienna Declaration of the World 
Conference on Human Rights, accepted by all United Nation 
(U.N.) member states.35  Other U.N. bodies have also referred to 
the right to remedial secession, such as the 1993 Report of the 
Rapporteur to the U.N. Sub-Commission Against the 
Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities on Possible 
Ways and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive 
Solution of Problems Involving Minorities,36 and the General 
Recommendation XXI adopted in 1996 by the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination.37 
B.  RECENT APPLICATIONS OF SELF-DETERMINATION PRINCIPLES 
Most recently, the Canadian Supreme Court dealt with the 
right to self-determination regarding the proposed separation of 
 
 33. Aaland Islands Report, supra note 4, at 34 (“[I]n the event that Finland . . . 
refused to grant the Aaland population the guarantees which we have just 
detailed . . . [t]he interests of the Aalanders . . . would then force us to advise the 
separation of the islands from Finland . . . .”). 
 34. See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), ¶ 2, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 
121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (“Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be 
construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or 
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity of political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a 
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or color.”). 
 35. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (Oct. 13, 1993), reprinted 
in 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993).  Note that the Vienna Declaration, unlike the 1970 
Declaration on Friendly Relations, “did not confine the list of impermissible 
distinctions to those based on ‘race, creed or color,’ indicating that distinctions based 
on religion, ethnicity, language or other factors would also trigger the right to 
secede.”  Scharf, supra note 4, at 382. 
 36. Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination & 
Prot. of Minorities, Protection of Minorities: Possible Ways and Means of Facilitating 
the Peaceful and Constructive Solution of Problems Involving Minorities, ¶ 84, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34 (Aug. 11, 1993). 
 37. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N. 
GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 18 at 125–26, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/51/18 (Sep. 30, 1996). 
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Quebec from Canada.38  During the 1990s, a secessionist 
movement in the Canadian province of Quebec threatened the 
stability of Canada when the citizens of Quebec increasingly 
sought to separate from Canada and form their own 
independent state.39  A popular referendum was organized in 
Quebec in 1995, in which more than 49% of the Quebecois 
expressed their desire to secede from Canada, and only a very 
small majority voted to stay within the mother state.40  Because 
of the divided nature of the secession referendum results, the 
Canadian Supreme Court was asked to issue a decision on the 
question of whether Quebec had the right to secede from 
Canada and if so, under what circumstances.  The Canadian 
Supreme Court issued its decision in 1998.41  Embracing the 
Aaland Islands precedent, the Canadian Supreme Court 
distinguished the right to internal self-determination from the 
right to external self-determination.42  While the former refers 
to a level of provincial autonomy within the existing state 
(Canada in this instance), including political, civic, cultural, 
religious, and social rights, the latter refers to the right to 
separate from the existing state in order to form a new, 
independent state.43  The Canadian Supreme Court, like the 
League of Nations, held that a people has a right to internal 
self-determination first, and that only if that right is not 
respected by the mother state, the right to break off may 
accrue.44  In other words, the right to separate is conditioned on 
the non-respect of the right to some form of provincial 
 
 38. See In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). 
 39. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 134. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). 
 43. Id. ¶ 126 (defining internal self-determination as “a people’s pursuit of its 
political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an 
existing state,” and defining external self-determination as potentially taking the 
form of secession and as arising “in only the most extreme of cases . . . under 
carefully defined circumstances.”); see also Gruda, supra note 14, at 380–81 
(detailing the content of the right to external self-determination and of the right to 
internal self-determination). 
 44. In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 134 (Can.) (“[W]hen a 
people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination 
internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession . . . .”).  Note that 
the Canadian Supreme Court declined to answer the issue of under what 
circumstances such a right to secession accrues, as it determined that the population 
of Quebec is entitled to meaningful internal self-determination and thus not in a 
position to claim the right to external self-determination.  DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 
10, at 222. 
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autonomy.45 
Recent developments in international law may also lend 
credence to the idea that the right to remedial secession has 
crystallized as a norm.  In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the 
republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Macedonia were entitled to secede because they had been denied 
the proper exercise of their right to democratic self-government 
and, in some cases, had been subject to ethnic violence by the 
central government in Belgrade.46 
These authorities suggest that if a government is at the 
high end of the scale of representative government, the only 
modes of self-determination that will be given international 
backing are those with minimal destabilizing effect and 
achieved by consent of all parties.  If a government is extremely 
unrepresentative and abusive, then much more potentially 
destabilizing modes of self-government, including independence, 
may be recognized as legitimate.  In the latter case, the 
secessionist group would be fully entitled to seek and receive 
external aid, and third-party states and organizations would 
have no duty to refrain from providing support.47 
In addition to the above conclusion, I argue that all such 
groups have also been supported by some of the most powerful 
states in the world.  As the discussion below on statehood and 
recognition will demonstrate, it is the support of the Great 
Powers that seems to enable minority groups to secede from 
their mother state.  Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and Macedonia were all supported by powerful European Union 
(EU) countries and the United States; their plight to external 
self-determination resulting in remedial secession was 
logistically, financially, economically, and politically supported 
by these countries.  Thus, although the right to remedial 
secession for oppressed peoples may be evolving into a norm of 
customary law academically speaking, in practice this right 
 
 45. In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶¶ 134–38 (Can.) (noting 
that when “the ability of a people to exercise its right to self-determination 
internally is somehow being totally frustrated,” only then does the right to external 
self-determination accrue). 
 46.  DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 222.  These former Yugoslav republics 
were successful in their quest to secede from their mother state because of the help 
and support of the Great Powers; thus, the Great Powers determined that these 
states were entitled to secede from the former Yugoslavia.  See infra Part V for 
further discussion of the influence that the Great Powers have on self-determination 
movements across the globe. 
 47. Scharf, supra note 4, at 384. 
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accrues only if there is sufficient political support for the people 
seeking secession. 
III.  SELF-DETERMINATION AND OTHER THEORIES 
If the breakaway entity is supported by the most powerful 
states, and if it exercises the right to external self-determination 
and declares its independence, it faces the legal challenge of 
proving that it qualifies as a state under international law.  
Moreover, it faces the political challenge of obtaining official 
recognition from the most relevant legal actors.  In fact, an 
entity that has not met these burdens risks being shunned by 
the relevant international actors.  Consequently, such an entity 
cannot engage in any meaningful form of international relations 
and will remain isolated, thereby undermining its chances of 
achieving viability.  Thus, self-determination rights are closely 
connected to other legal theories, such as statehood and 
recognition.  In order to exercise its right to external self-
determination, the breakaway entity may need external support 
from powerful states in the form of intervention against the 
territorial sovereignty of its mother state, which may seek to 
prevent the breakaway entity from separating.  The notion of 
self-determination is, therefore, closely connected to two other 
concepts: sovereignty and intervention. 
A.  SELF-DETERMINATION, STATEHOOD, AND RECOGNITION 
Once an entity breaks off from its mother state and seeks to 
become recognized as a new state, the legal question that arises 
is whether that entity satisfies the relevant international legal 
criteria of statehood.  According to the 1933 Montevideo 
Convention, an entity can achieve statehood if it fulfills four 
criteria: it has a defined territory, a permanent population, a 
government, and the capacity to enter into international 
relations.48  Scholars have also elaborated additional criteria for 
statehood, including independence, sovereignty, permanence, 
willingness and ability to observe international law, a certain 
degree of civilization, and, in some cases, recognition.49  
 
 48. Seventh International Conference of American States, Montevideo 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 3802 L.N.T.S. 19, art. 1 
[hereinafter Montevideo Convention]. 
 49. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
passim (1979). 
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Statehood is a legal theory that seeks to justify the attribution 
of statehood on objective criteria, which are at least, in theory, 
independent from the political reality underlying many 
attempts at secession or separation.50 
In practice, the theory of statehood has led to anomalous 
results.51  For example, the first criterion of the Montevideo 
Convention requires that an entity has a defined territory.  
Many entities that we routinely consider states have a disputed 
and often undefined territory.52  For example, Israel’s territory 
is disputed by its Arab neighbors; the two Koreas have battled 
over their border for decades; potent rebel movements dispute 
the territories of Somalia and Sudan.53  As to the second 
criterion, many entities that we view as states have un-
permanent, migratory populations.  The Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Sudan, and Iraq, to name a few, have all experienced 
significant refugee crises, resulting in shifts in their respective 
populations, without thereby losing their statehood on the 
international scene.54  Other states have very small populations, 
like the Pacific island state of Nauru (10,000), or the city-state 
of San Marino (24,000), and yet such entities are still treated as 
states.55  Regarding the third criterion, entities with collapsed 
governments have also remained “states” in the past.  For 
example, Afghanistan throughout the 1990s did not have a 
stable government, and yet it was still treated as a state and 
retained its seat in all major international organizations.56  
Finally, as to the fourth criterion, many entities routinely 
considered states do not have the capacity to enter into 
international relations.57  Small nations like Liechtenstein and 
Monaco depend on Switzerland and France respectively for their 
 
 50. In fact, article 3 of the Montevideo Convention states that “[t]he political 
existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states.”  Montevideo 
Convention, supra note 48, art. 3. 
 51. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 115 (noting the flexible interpretation of 
the statehood criteria by “global elites”). 
 52. Id. at 115–16. 
 53. Id. at 116. 
 54. Refugees International, DR Congo, http://www.refugeesinternational.org/ 
where-we-work/africa/dr-congo (last visited on Oct. 14, 2009); Lydia Polgreen, 
Refugee Crisis Grows as Darfur War Crosses a Border, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, at 
A1; Refugees International, Iraq, http://www.refugeesinternational.org/ 
where-we-work/middle-east/iraq (last visited on Oct. 14, 2009). 
 55. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 115. 
 56. Id. at 116. 
 57. Id. 
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national defense.58  Several Pacific island nations, likewise, 
depend on the United States and New Zealand for their defense 
and have been dubbed “freely associated states.”59  Other small 
nations depend on the United States, and/or other economically 
powerful nations, for trade and commercial relations.60 
The above examples demonstrate that the legal theory of 
statehood remains inconsistently applied in practice, and often 
it is the geopolitical reality of a given region that dictates 
whether an entity is treated as a state by the international 
community.  Statehood in practice seems to hinge on 
recognition: in other words, an entity seems to be treated as a 
state only if the outside world, and specifically, the most 
powerful states (the Great Powers), wishes to recognize it as 
such.61  As I argue below in Part V, an entity will be recognized 
as a new state only if it garners the support of the most 
powerful states in the international legal arena. 
There are two theories of recognition under international 
law: the declaratory view and the constitutive view.62  Under the 
former, recognition is seen as a purely political act having no 
bearing on the legal elements of statehood.63  Outside states can 
choose to recognize the new state, or not, but that decision does 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. (describing the special arrangements that Micronesia, Palau, the Cook 
Islands, and Niue—the co-called freely associated states—have with the United 
States and with New Zealand). 
 60. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 115–16 (describing the various 
dependent relationships that smaller and developing states sometimes have with 
larger, developed states). 
 61. A cynic might ask why international law cares about statehood at all.  In 
other words, why would a newly independent state care for proving to anyone on the 
outside that it meets the requirements of statehood?  If the people who live in a 
given country are happy with the achievement of independence, they should not 
have to worry about proving to the outside world that their home nation qualifies as 
a state under international law.  However, the reality proves the opposite: a new 
“state” faces crucial challenges after its assertion of independence, such as 
economical and trade issues, developmental problems, security concerns, monetary 
hurdles, etc.  Thus, an entity seeking to become a state on the international scene 
must first persuade external actors that it is a state in order to become fully engaged 
in international relations with such external actors, on which it often depends.  The 
external actors on which virtually all new states depend are the most powerful 
states in the world, or, as described in this Article, the Great Powers.  Thus, it is the 
Great Powers’ determination that an entity shall (or shall not) be recognized as a 
new state that often pre-determines the outcome of a separation struggle.  See infra 
Part V. 
 62. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 137–38. 
 63. Id. at 137. 
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not influence the legal determination of statehood.64  Under the 
latter, recognition is seen as one of the main elements of 
statehood.65  Thus, an entity cannot achieve statehood unless it 
is recognized by outside actors as a state.66 
While most academics would support the declaratory view,67 
the constitutive view has teeth in practice nonetheless.  In fact, 
one of the four criteria of statehood—the capacity to enter into 
international relations—seems closely linked to recognition, 
because an entity claiming to be a state cannot conduct 
international relations with other states unless those states are 
willing to enter into such relations.68  In other words, the 
conduct of international relations is a two-way street, involving 
the new “state” as well as outside actors that have to be willing 
to accept the new “state” as their sovereign partner.69  No state 
can exist in a vacuum—a fact well established by international 
practice.  When Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) decided to 
separate from Great Britain and to form an independent state in 
1965, most of the world refused to recognize Southern Rhodesia 
as a state.70  Consequently, Southern Rhodesia remained 
isolated from the world and was unable to conduct international 
relations.71  The non-recognition of Southern Rhodesia by 
outside actors prevented it from fully exercising the attributes of 
legal statehood.72  Thus, recognition, whether it is considered as 
a political or legal act, has a direct impact on the pragmatic 
determination of statehood: whether an entity will be able to 
 
 64. Id. (“An entity that meets the criteria of statehood immediately enjoys all 
the rights and duties of a state regardless of the views of other states.”). 
 65. Id. at 138. 
 66. Id. (“[T]he refusal by states to afford recognition would mean that the 
entity claiming statehood would not be entitled to the rights of a state.”). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. (arguing that “if states refuse to acknowledge that an entity meets these 
criteria . . . they might continue to treat the claimant as something less than a 
state;” thus, an unrecognized state may find that its passports are unacceptable to 
the immigration authorities of other states). 
 69. Thus, an important treatise states that “[r]ecognition, while declaratory of 
an existing fact, is constitutive in nature, at least so far as concerns relations with 
the recognizing state.”  1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 133 (Robert Jennings & 
Arthur Watts ed., 9th ed. 1992). 
 70. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 138.  Note that the U.N. Security Council 
condemned the Southern Rhodesia declaration of independence and declared that it 
had no legal validity.  S.C. Res. 217, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/217 (Nov. 20, 1965). 
 71. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 138 (noting that nearly all states refused 
to conclude treaties with Southern Rhodesia). 
 72. Note that the situation was resolved in 1978, following a peace accord 
which led to a majority government in Zimbabwe.  Id. 
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truly act as a state on the international scene. 
While international recognition is no longer widely considered to be a 
required element of statehood, in practice the ability to exercise the 
benefits bestowed on sovereign states contained in the Westphalian 
sovereignty package requires respect of those doctrines and 
application of them to the state in question by other states in the 
interstate system.73 
In addition to the declaratory and constitutive views, 
scholars have advanced a third, intermediary view on 
recognition.  The intermediary view seeks to combine the 
declaratory and constitutive view while acknowledging what 
truly goes on in practice.  It asserts that recognition is a political 
act independent of statehood, but that outside states have a 
duty to recognize a new state if that state objectively satisfies 
the four criteria of statehood.74  “Recognition, while in principle 
declaratory, may thus be of great importance in particular 
cases.  In any event, at least where the recognizing government 
is addressing itself to legal rather than purely political 
considerations, it is important evidence of legal status.”75 
Finally, another wrinkle to the international theory of 
recognition was added in the early 1990s, following the break-up 
of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia.  At that 
time, the EU foreign ministers developed guidelines on the 
recognition of new states in Europe.76  Concerned with the 
existence and maltreatment of minorities within the former 
Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia, the EU foreign 
ministers announced that the criteria for recognition of new 
states within the EU would include respect for human rights, as 
well as the protection of minority rights.77  Thus, an entity 
applying for statehood within the EU had to prove that it 
treated minority groups fairly and that it respected minority 
rights in its territory.78 
 
 73. Kelly, supra note 1, at 382 (citing LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
POLITICS AND VALUES 15–16 (1995)). 
 74. Id. (citing LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 13–
15 (1995)). 
 75. CRAWFORD, supra note 49, at 74. 
 76. European Community, Declaration on the “Guidelines on the Recognition of 
New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union,” 31 I.L.M. 1486, 1487 (1992) 
(requiring “respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations . . . especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights,” 
and “guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities” in order 
for a new state to be recognized). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. at 1486. 
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While these criteria have not reached the status of 
international custom and do not bind states that are not 
members of the EU, they show nonetheless an evolution of 
international law in the field of recognition.79  In fact, it seems 
that the international community today allows outside actors to 
impose additional requirements on entities striving for 
recognition.80  Regional bodies, organizations, and states can 
precondition recognition on compliance with specific criteria 
that have nothing to do with the legal contours of statehood.  
This phenomenon illustrates once more the fact that powerful 
states or groups of states, like the EU, often dictate the fate of 
independence-seeking movements by choosing to legitimize their 
plights (or not) only under specific conditions. 
In the context of the EU, such imposition of additional 
criteria of recognition was used several times by the Badinter 
Commission, an arbitral body of experts established to deal with 
the various issues arising out of the Yugoslav crisis in the 
1990s.81  With respect to Macedonia, the Badinter Commission 
insisted that Macedonia undertake not to alter its frontiers by 
means of force and credited Macedonia for having amended its 
constitution to renounce all territorial claims against 
neighboring states.82  After Macedonia agreed to follow the 
Badinter Commission recommendations, the EU foreign 
ministers decided to impose yet an additional requirement on 
Macedonia by indicating that this new state would be 
recognized only if it used a name that did not include the term 
Macedonia.83  This “requirement” resulted from a geopolitical 
 
 79. The Badinter Commission, an arbitral body of experts operating in the 
early 1990s to resolve legal issues arising from the Yugoslav dissolution, added a 
new criterion for recognition of new states, because “it embraced democratization 
and respect for human rights” as such criteria.  Enver Hasani, Self-Determination 
Under the Terms of the 2002 Union Agreement Between Serbia and Montenegro: 
Tracing the Origins of Kosovo’s Self-Determination, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 305, 313 
(2005). 
 80. For example, the EU set out the respect of human rights as a “fundamental 
prerequisite for recognition.”  Brown, supra note 14, at 247 (citing European 
Community, Declaration on the “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,” 31 I.L.M 1486, 1486–87 (1992)). 
 81. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 114–15. 
 82. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, On the Recognition of 
the Socialist Republic of Macedonia by the European Community and Its Member 
States, July 4, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1507 (1992).  Note that the debate over Macedonian 
recognition was sparked by Greek claims that Macedonia would have territorial 
claims against northern Greece, a region also known as Macedonia.  See DUNOFF ET 
AL., supra note 10, at 142. 
 83. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 143.  Ultimately, this issue was resolved 
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grievance by EU member Greece, which was afraid that the new 
State of Macedonia would have territorial claims to a part of 
northern Greece that had also been known as Macedonia.84  The 
use of such additional criteria for recognition by the EU signals 
a trend of conditioning recognition on the respect of 
fundamental rights and rules of international law, as well as on 
obedience to regional geopolitical equilibrium.85  In other words, 
powerful decision-makers are telling new states that they will 
only be accepted as full players if they vow to respect the rule of 
law and to adhere to preserving regional stability and peace. 
Moreover, the use of the additional criteria for recognition 
described above demonstrates the leverage and power that the 
Great Powers have on the international scene.  Entities seeking 
to become recognized as new states must garner the support and 
help of the most powerful states.  As a corollary, entities seeking 
to become recognized as new states must, at times, accept the 
rules set forth by the super-states, as Macedonia did when it 
sought to separate from the former Yugoslavia.  The acceptance 
of these new recognition rules by the weaker states 
demonstrates their acquiescence in the new global order of 
sovereign, more sovereign, and less sovereign states.  Whether 
an entity ultimately acquires the right to self-determine its fate 
and whether it is ultimately recognized as a new state correlates 
directly to whether that entity enjoys the support of the most 
powerful sovereign states. 
B.  SELF-DETERMINATION, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERVENTION 
The principle of self-determination is also closely linked to 
the notions of state sovereignty and intervention.86  State 
 
when Macedonia was admitted to the U.N. under the name of “The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia” pending settlement of the name issue with Greece.  Id.  The 
United Sates government decided in 2004 to refer to the country as the Republic of 
Macedonia.  Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. The latter proposition of conditioning recognition on the respect of the 
regional geopolitical equilibrium is well illustrated by the Greek opposition to the 
recognition of Macedonia if the new entity wanted to be called by that name.  In fact, 
nothing in the international legal doctrine on recognition authorizes states to 
require new entities to change their name if they wish to be recognized; yet, in 
practice, such results are possible and have occurred at least once in Europe, as the 
Macedonian example demonstrates. 
 86. In fact, the earned sovereignty theory also supports this view of qualified 
state sovereignty, as it perceives sovereignty as “a bundle of authority and functions 
which may at times be shared by the state and sub-state entities as well as 
international institutions.”  See James R. Hooper & Paul R. Williams, Earned 
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sovereignty, in its Westphalian form, typically includes: an 
equality of states within the international community, a general 
prohibition on foreign interference with internal affairs, a 
territorial integrity of the nation-state, and an inviolability of 
international borders.87  However, as early as the mid-19th 
century, scholars noticed a “sliding scale of sovereign equality” 
among states by linking “the degree of sovereignty a state has to 
the degree of equality it enjoys on the international stage.”88  
The notion of unequal state sovereignty was further enhanced 
through the creation of the United Nations and its Security 
Council structure, giving veto power to five super-states: the 
United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and China.  
Scholars and historians have dubbed such powerful states the 
“Great Powers.”  Membership in this evolving club of super-
sovereign states varies, because the status of any country as a 
Great Power depends on the other states’ willingness to admit 
the existence of yet another super power.  Nonetheless, most 
would agree that the Great Powers club currently also includes 
three other G-8 countries: Germany, Italy, and Japan.89  The 
Great Powers possess greater sovereignty attributes than other 
states because they have enhanced decision-making authority in 
the institutional context, as well as in the economic realm.90 
Because the Great Powers are essentially more “sovereign” 
than other states, they may engage in interventions and cross 
other states’ borders, in the name of preserving some higher 
ideals.  In the modern world, Great Powers can “cross 
theoretically unbreachable frontiers either individually or 
collectively,” in a variety of differently justified state 
interventions.91  One of such forms of intervention, when Great 
Powers breach frontiers to avoid human suffering and tragedy, 
has been termed “humanitarian intervention.”92  A self-
determination seeking people may be aided by the Great 
Powers’ decision to organize a humanitarian intervention to 
prevent a central government from oppressing that people.  
Conversely, the Great Powers may decide not to help a 
struggling minority movement, by refusing to stage an 
 
Sovereignty: The Political Dimension, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 355, 357 (2003). 
 87. Kelly, supra note 1, at 376. 
 88. Id. at 377 (citing HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 33 
(3d ed. 1866)). 
 89. Id. at 365. 
 90. Id. at 365–66. 
 91. Id. at 381. 
 92. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009  9:06 AM 
2010] RIGHT TO EXTERNAL SELF-DETERMINATION 155 
 
intervention and by implicitly turning a blind eye to the 
oppressive policies of the governing regime. 
Some American presidents have embraced this intervention 
theory, and have even attempted to stretch its contours by 
constructing a so-called “involuntary sovereignty waiver” 
justification for the application of intervention.  Thus, Richard 
Haass, the former Director of Policy Planning for the State 
Department in the G. W. Bush administration and the current 
President of the Council on Foreign Relations, advanced the 
idea that countries constructively waive their traditional 
sovereignty shield and invite international intervention when 
they undertake to massacre their own people, harbor terrorists, 
or pursue weapons of mass destruction.93  According to Haass, 
state sovereignty does not enjoy absolute protection in the 
modern world and has been eroded through the forces of 
globalization; thus, we need to adjust our way of thinking to 
account for “weak states” and “outlaw regimes” which jeopardize 
their sovereignty “by pursuing reckless policies fraught with 
danger for their citizens and the international community.”94  
Haass further reasoned that “sovereignty is not a blank check,” 
and considered that Great Powers have unique intervention 
rights with respect to rogue regimes that have forfeited their 
sovereign privileges and their immunity from external, armed 
intervention.95  According to Haass, there are three 
circumstances that justify intervention: 1) where a state 
commits or fails to prevent genocide or crimes against humanity 
in its territory; 2) where countries find it necessary to take 
action to protect their nationals against other states that harbor 
international terrorists; and 3) where states pursue weapons of 
mass destruction.96 
 
 93. Haass constructed this theory initially in 2002, with respect to States 
which commit atrocities against their people or harbor terrorists.  Nicholas Lemann, 
The Next World Order, NEW YORKER, Apr. 1, 2002, at 45–46.  Haass then amended 
this theory in 2003, when he included States that pursue weapons of mass 
destruction.  See Richard N. Haass, Remarks to the School of Foreign Service and 
the Mortara Center for International Studies, Georgetown University: Sovereignty: 
Existing Rights, Evolving Responsibilities (Jan. 14, 2003), in INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, 698–99 (Henry J. Steiner et al. eds., 3d ed. 2008), 
available at http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/2003/01-15.htm [hereinafter 
Georgetown Speech]. 
 94. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 403 (citing RICHARD N. HAASS, INTERVENTION: 
THE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY FORCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 13 (rev’d ed. 
1999)). 
 95. Georgetown Speech, supra note 93, at 698; see Kelly, supra note 1, at 403. 
 96. Kelly, supra note 1, at 404. 
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These three exceptions to the norm against intervention are 
justified, according to Haass, because sovereignty is conditional, 
and “[w]hen states violate minimum standards by committing, 
permitting, or threatening intolerable acts against their own 
people or other nations, then some of the privileges of 
sovereignty are forfeited.”97  Under this theory, it can no longer 
be asserted that a state may internally do whatever it wishes, as 
such actions necessarily impact other states,98 and thus give 
rights to other states to intervene.  In other words, when a state 
engages in a particular kind of offensive behavior, it has 
involuntarily “waived” its sovereignty.99  The involuntary waiver 
of sovereignty theory illustrates another example of the 
dominance exercised by the Great Powers on the international 
scene.  Under this theory, the Great Powers have expanded 
rights to intervene in the affairs of another, less sovereign, 
country anytime that the Great Powers see the other country’s 
behavior as troublesome.  Thus, the Great Powers, and not the 
United Nations or any other global body, acquire global 
decision-making authority under the involuntary sovereignty 
waiver theory when it comes to intervention within any other 
country, anywhere in the world, at any time.  The Great Powers 
rule, and hegemony, over the rest of the world becomes 
dangerously potent if one adopts the involuntary sovereignty 
waiver theory without any reservations or restrictions. 
The theory of involuntary sovereignty waiver has been 
advanced in the recent decades to justify different types of 
intervention against different “rogue” regimes.  For example, in 
1991, a U.N.-sanctioned intervention on behalf of the Kurds in 
northern Iraq was justified on the grounds that the Kurds were 
suffering severe human rights deprivations inflicted by the Iraqi 
government.100  More recently, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) intervention in Kosovo in 1999 
exemplifies the notion of humanitarian intervention justified on 
the grounds of involuntary sovereignty waiver.  Serbia engaged 
in a campaign of human rights violations in Kosovo; by doing so, 
under this theory it waived its sovereignty over the Kosovar 
region and “invited” outside actors to intervene.101  Thus, 
 
 97. Id. at 405 (citing RICHARD N. HAASS, INTERVENTION: THE USE OF AMERICAN 
MILITARY FORCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 13 (rev’d ed. 1999)). 
 98. Kelly, supra note 1, at 404–05. 
 99. Id. at 402 (citing Lemann, supra note 93, at 42). 
 100. Scharf, supra note 4, at 383. 
 101. See infra Part V (discussing the idea of an involuntary sovereignty waiver 
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outside actors were legally justified in encouraging and 
providing for the Kosovar independence because Serbia’s claim 
to territorial sovereignty was not absolute and remained subject 
to external influences.102  In other words, because of the Serbian 
government’s oppressive policies in Kosovo, Serbian sovereignty 
over Kosovo diminished to such a minimal level that the notion 
of territorial sovereignty became trumped by the necessity of 
humanitarian intervention or other kinds of outside 
interference.103 
The idea of self-determination, in the modern world, seems 
closely linked to state sovereignty and intervention.  Because 
states are only “conditionally” sovereign, they may not suppress 
legitimate self-determination movements indefinitely.  If states 
choose to oppress self-determination movements, then such 
movements may seek help from external actors, typically the 
Great Powers, which may intervene to help the struggling 
movement achieve some form of self-determination.  As in the 
case of Kosovo, the Great Powers may intervene to assist the 
struggling movement in achieving the most drastic form of 
external self-determination, namely, remedial secession and 
independence.104  The presence of the Great Powers on the 
international legal scene has eroded the sovereignty of other, 
“lesser” states.  Thus, the sovereignty of the lesser states has 
become conditional.  Moreover, the Great Powers have indicated 
their willingness to intervene in the affairs of such lesser states 
 
by rogue states and regimes, whereby such rogue states and regimes involuntary 
waive their sovereignty and invite external interference to remedy their own 
wrongdoing). 
 102. Several influential authors have supported external intervention in Kosovo 
on humanitarian grounds.  See generally Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are 
We Moving Towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian 
Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23 (1999); Richard A. 
Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 
847 (1999); Thomas M. Franck, Lessons of Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 857 (1999); 
Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention,” 93 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 824 (1999); Ruth Wedgewood, NATO’s Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 
828 (1999).  Other authors have supported NATO actions against the FRY with 
reservations, arguing that the Kosovo case should not set a precedent for the future 
but should be considered an exception due to regional considerations after the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia.  See W. Michael Reisman, Kosovo’s Antinomies, 93 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 860, 860 (1999). 
 103. See Reisman, supra note 102, at 860–62 (arguing that human rights 
violations in Kosovo effectively eliminated the defense of domestic jurisdiction and 
merited military action). 
 104. In the case of Kosovo, the Great Powers intervened through NATO by 
engaging in a series of air strikes on the territory of Kosovo’s then mother-state, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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to aid independence-seeking movements, when such movements 
are viewed as legitimate by the Great Powers.105  The notion of 
self-determination has therefore become intertwined with the 
notions of state sovereignty and intervention, and all three are 
intrinsically linked with the presence of the Great Powers. 
IV.  CASE STUDIES 
Several case studies illustrate the link between self-
determination, state sovereignty, and intervention described 
above.  These studies include East Timor, Chechnya, Kosovo, 
and Georgia.  In each of these countries a “people” struggled for 
self-determination and ultimately independence.  Yet, only the 
Timorese and the Kosovars were successful in their plight for 
self-determination, primarily because the Great Powers 
determined that their cause was legitimate.  The Chechens, and 
the South Ossetians and Abkhazians, were not as lucky: their 
struggles for self-determination remained unsupported by the 
Great Powers and these regions still remain governed by the 
same central regimes. 
A.  EAST TIMOR 
East Timor forcibly became a part of Indonesia in 1976, 
when Indonesia claimed East Timor as its 27th Province.106  
Prior to 1976, East Timor had been colonized and administered 
by Portugal.107  The international community was swift in its 
condemnation of Indonesia following the 1976 takeover and the 
United Nations continued to recognize Portugal as East Timor’s 
official administrator.108  The Indonesian rule over East Timor 
“imposed a military force that viciously led to human rights and 
humanity violations,”109 and was often marked by extreme 
violence and brutality.  Estimates of the number of East 
Timorese who died during the occupation vary from 60,000 to 
 
 105. As will be discussed below, the examples of East Timor and Kosovo 
illustrate the idea of minority movements aided by the world community in their 
quest for independence.  See infra Parts IV.A, IV.C. 
 106. Jani Purnawanty, Various Perspectives in Understanding the East Timor 
Crisis, 14 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 61, 65 (2000). 
 107. Id. at 62 (noting that the Portuguese first colonized East Timor in 1533). 
 108. Jonathan I. Charney, Self-Determination: Chechnya, Kosovo and East 
Timor, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 455, 465 & n.36 (2001). 
 109. Purnawanty, supra note 106, at 68–69. 
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200,000.110 
In 1999, the East Timorese people voted in a United 
Nations-organized referendum to separate from Indonesia.111  
Indonesia protested the referendum results and was accused of 
backing violent militias to attack and intimidate the East 
Timorese populations.112  The United Nations Security Council, 
in Resolution 1264, established the International Force for East 
Timor, a peacekeeping force to safeguard the country.113  East 
Timor was then administered by the United Nations, with 
substantial support from other countries.  East Timor became 
the first new sovereign state of the 21st century by obtaining 
independence on May 20, 2002 when United Nations Secretary-
General Kofi Annan handed over authority of the country to the 
new government.114  A few months later, East Timor joined the 
United Nations as a new, independent state.115  Sporadic 
outbreaks of violence have plagued East Timor since its 
independence, but the constant military involvement by the 
international community has managed to halt the spread of 
violence.116 
The East Timorese struggle for independence illustrates 
perfectly the paradigm of how the Great Powers’ support, or lack 
thereof, influences the result of such a self-determination 
struggle.  The East Timorese people fought for independence 
during several decades.  During the Cold War era, however, 
their struggle was unsupported by some of the Great Powers, 
and the East Timorese were not able to assert independence 
from Indonesia on their own, as they lacked the political, 
economic, and military capability to do so.  After the end of the 
 
 110. See Joe Nunes, East Timor: Acceptable Slaughters, http://chss.montclair.edu/ 
english/furr/nunestimor.html (last modified Sept. 8, 1999). 
 111. Purnawanty, supra note 106, at 67. 
 112. See, e.g., id. (“In fact, the Indonesian Military has been accused of arming, 
funding and preparing local militias for a guerrilla movement in case a pro-
independence group should emerge as a winner of the conflict.”); see also Jean 
d’Aspremont, Post-Conflict Administration as Democracy-Building Instruments,  
9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (2008) (noting that violence ensued after the United Nations 
organized referendum). 
 113. Purnawanty, supra note 106, at 70. 
 114. East Timor: Birth of a Nation, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION, May 19, 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1996673.stm [hereinafter East Timor, Birth]; 
see also Timor-Leste: UN Admits Newest Member State, UN NEWS CENTRE Sept. 27, 
2002, http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=27 (declaring East 
Timor the first new country of the millennium). 
 115. UN NEWS CENTRE, supra note 114. 
 116. East Timor, Birth, supra note 114. 
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Cold War, the Great Powers began supporting the East 
Timorese, which was reflected in the Security Council decision-
making process, when virtually all Security Council members 
agreed that the East Timorese should no longer remain 
governed by Indonesia.117  Thus, the United Nations Security 
Council authorized the deployment of peacekeepers to East 
Timor and helped organize the popular referendum and 
elections, which ultimately paved the way to Timorese 
independence.118  Absent the global and the Great Powers’ 
support in the post Cold War period, it is doubtful that East 
Timor would have gained independence from Indonesia as 
easily. 
B.  CHECHNYA  
Chechnya existed until the early 1990s as part of the former 
Soviet Union.119  Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991, Chechnya obtained de facto independence after the so-
called First Chechen War with Russia.120  During this period, 
Chechnya became a “center of criminal activities of 
extraordinary proportions” and generally failed to build any 
representative institutions of a viable state.121  In fact, after the 
First Chechen War, parliamentary and presidential elections 
took place in January 1997, and the newly elected government 
in Chechnya, while seeking to maintain Chechen sovereignty, 
appealed to Moscow for help.122  Chechnya needed to rebuild 
itself, as its infrastructure and economy were heavily 
 
 117. See Sreeram Chaulia, A World of Selfistans?, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM,  
Mar. 13, 2008, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/171-emerging/ 
29875.html (“As long as General Suharto [the Indonesian leader] was necessary for 
the West’s Cold War agenda, the United States, Britain, and Australia helped 
Indonesia to annex and control East Timor.  Once Indonesia lost the support of the 
great powers, these same states ganged up to recognize East Timor’s right to self-
determination and acted as midwives for its birth as an independent state.”). 
 118. Scholars have already noted the support of the United Nations for the East 
Timorese struggle for independence.  See, e.g., d’Aspremont, supra note 112, at 8–10. 
 119. See Freedom House, Chechnya [Russia] (2003), http://www.freedomhouse.org/ 
modules/mod_call_dsp_country-fiw.cfm?year=2003&country=2593 (last visited on 
Oct. 14, 2009). 
 120. Charney, supra note 108, at 462–63 & n.27. 
 121. Id. at 463; see also James Marson, The Price of Chechnya’s Peace, 
GUARDIAN, Apr. 17, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/apr/17/ 
chechnya-russia-withdrawal-moscow (noting that Chechnya had de facto 
independence after the First Chechen War). 
 122. See Freedom House, supra note 119. 
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undermined by the war.123  Russia sent money for the 
rehabilitation of the Chechen State, but most of these funds 
were stolen by Chechen authorities and distributed between 
favored warlords.124  Chechnya also faced a refugee crisis; 
almost half a million people had been internally displaced and 
lived in refugee camps or overcrowded villages.125  Fearing 
further violence, Russian military troops remained stationed in 
Chechnya.126 
In September 1999, Moscow accused the Chechens with 
involvement in a series of apartment bombings, which took 
place in several Russian cities.127  As a retaliatory measure, 
Russia initiated a prolonged air campaign of military strikes 
against Chechnya, followed by a ground offensive in October 
1999.128  The latter effectively started the Second Chechen 
War.129  Because the second war had been much better 
organized and planned than the first Chechen War, Russian 
military forces were quickly able to re-establish control over 
most Chechen regions.130  In February 2000, Russian forces 
recaptured Grozny, the Chechen capital, and the pro-
independence Chechen regime crumbled.131  In the following 
years, Russia was successful in installing a pro-Russia Chechen 
regime, and the most prominent separatist leaders died.132  
Nonetheless, violence still occurs in the North Caucasus and 
Chechnya remains a troubled and potentially explosive 
region.133 
Chechnya illustrates the idea of a struggling minority 
group, seeking self-determination rights from the central 
government (Russia), unaided by the Great Powers.134  Alone, 
 
 123. See id. (noting that Chechnya pressured Moscow for help after the war 
because its “economy and infrastructure were virtually destroyed”). 
 124. See id. (noting that reconstruction efforts have been plagued by corruption). 
 125. ALEX GOLDFARB WITH MARINA LITVINENKO, DEATH OF A DISSIDENT: THE 
POISONING OF ALEXANDER LITVINENKO AND THE RETURN OF THE KGB 95 (2007). 
 126. See Freedom House, supra note 119 (noting that the 1996 peace deal called 
for the withdrawal of most Russian forces from Chechnya). 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See id. 
 134. Scholars have already noted the lack of international support for Chechnya, 
attributing it to the fact that Russia was a major military and economic power, 
holding veto power on the U.N. Security Council.  See Charney, supra note 108, at 
459. 
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Chechnya could not face the Russian military power and could 
not undertake the economic challenges of achieving viability as 
an independent state.  Some have suggested that it is the 
Chechen inability to build democratic institutions and peace 
during its de facto independence, in between the two Chechen 
Wars, which caused the Great Powers to refuse to recognize 
Chechnya as a legitimate self-determination seeking entity.135  
However, I posit that it is the Russian membership in the Great 
Powers, and precisely, the Russian veto power on the Security 
Council, which directly caused the lack of international 
involvement in Chechnya.136  Unlike the situation in East Timor 
and in Kosovo, as will be discussed directly below, the Great 
Powers had no incentive to help Chechnya achieve 
independence and statehood.  One of the Great Powers, Russia, 
was directly opposed to any Chechen form of sovereignty 
because Russia managed to reacquire control over Chechnya 
and has always viewed it as a territory of Russia.137  I argue 
that the other Great Powers, including the United States, have 
simply not had enough geopolitical clout and stamina to engage 
in a full-blown diplomatic, and possibly military, altercation 
with Russia over the Chechen situation.  Thus, while the other 
Great Powers were sympathetic to the Chechen cause and 
outraged by human rights violations in Chechnya, their rhetoric 
remained relatively mild and none of them chose to formally 
oppose Russia.  Chechnya could not and cannot achieve 
independence alone.   
C.  KOSOVO 
Kosovo had been an autonomous province of Serbia, one of 
the six republics within the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY).138  When the SFRY dissolved in the early 
1990s, Kosovo remained a part of the SFRY successor, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) first, then a part of Serbia 
and Montenegro, and when Montenegro broke away from the 
 
 135. Id. at 462–63. 
 136. Even scholars like Charney, who advances the idea that the Chechens’ 
inability to build democratic institutions contributed to the lack of international 
support for their cause, freely admit that it is at least possible that Russia’s 
tremendous power as a state may have prevented the Chechens from garnering 
significant international support.  Id. at 459. 
 137. See Freedom House, supra note 119. 
 138. Brown, supra note 14, at 238. 
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latter, Kosovo remained a part of the sole Serbian State.139 
Until the late 1980s, Kosovo had the status of an 
autonomous province within the SFRY and exercised important 
regional self-governance functions.140  More importantly, its 
predominantly ethnic Albanian population enjoyed multiple 
rights, such as the right to education in the Albanian language, 
the right to Albanian language media, the right to celebrate 
cultural holidays, and the right to generally preserve its ethnic 
structure and belonging.141  However, in response to ethnic 
Albanian uprising movements throughout Kosovo, staged by 
guerilla-like paramilitary groups, the Serbian leadership 
undertook draconian measures in the late 1980s to curb the 
upheaval.142  Thus, Kosovo’s autonomous province status was 
removed and the Albanian population was deprived of 
important civil and political rights.143  
In 1999, when the former Serbian president Slobodan 
Milosevic engaged in a brutal campaign of oppression144—once 
again in response to ethnic upheavals in Kosovo staged by the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a separatist movement 
operating in Kosovo145—the international community responded 
 
 139. Id. at 238–40. 
 140. The 1974 SFRY Constitution granted Kosovo the status of an autonomous 
province within the country’s federal structure.  Gruda, supra note 13, at 387.  
Under the terms of the 1974 Constitution, Kosovo had the following rights: the right 
to adopt and change its constitution; the right to adopt laws; the right to exercise 
constitutional judicial functions and to have a constitutional court; judicial 
autonomy and the right to a Supreme Court; the right to decide on changes of its 
territory; the right to ratify treaties that were concluded with foreign states and 
international bodies; the right to have independent organs and ministries within the 
local government.  Id. 
 141. Henry H. Perritt Jr., Final Status for Kosovo, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 7 
(2005) (noting that Kosovar Albanians were allowed to open an Albanian-language 
university in Pristina in 1969, and that the institutional changes under the 1974 
SFRY Constitution resulted “in the growing Albanization of educational, political, 
and legal institutions”); see also Gruda, supra note 13, at 387 (noting the significant 
political and legal autonomy granted to Kosovo by the 1974 SFRY Constitution). 
 142. Perritt, supra note 141, at 8 (describing the measures undertaken by 
Slobodan Milosevic beginning in 1989 to curb the Albanian upheaval). 
 143. Brown, supra note 14, at 263 (noting that amendments to Serbia’s 
constitution in 1989 and 1990 negated the Kosovar autonomy). 
 144. Perritt, supra note 141, at 8 (describing the Serbian campaign of ethnic 
cleansing in Kosovo, accompanied by massive violence against the Kosovar 
Albanians by Serbian paramilitary, military and police forces). 
 145. Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolving the Conflict 
Over Kosovo’s Final Status, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 387, 397 (2003) (“[S]ome 
elements of the Kosovar Albanian population formed the Kosovo Liberation Army 
[KLA], which murdered members of the Serbian police and military forces and 
perceived Kosovar Albanian collaborators.”); see also Perritt, supra note 141, at 8 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009  9:06 AM 
164 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol. 19:1 
 
with force.146  NATO countries launched a series of air strikes 
on the territory of Serbia, which ultimately forced Milosevic to 
sign a peace agreement with the Kosovars at Rambouillet, 
France, in June 1999.147  Under the terms of the Rambouillet 
Peace Agreement and, subsequently, United Nations Resolution 
1244, Kosovo was to be administered by a United Nations 
provisional authority, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK).  Its safety was to be guarded by a NATO-led military 
force, KFOR, and subsequent negotiations were to take place in 
the near future, to decide about the true fate of the province.148 
Once Milosevic stepped down as Serbia’s president and 
leader, the Serbian outlook and its position toward the West 
changed and Milosevic’s nationalist rule was replaced by a more 
“Western-focused government.”149  It became clear that in order 
to join Western Europe—and possibly become a member of the 
EU—Serbia had to sacrifice Kosovo, or to at least refrain from 
using force in order to prevent it from breaking off.150  The 
 
(noting that the KLA began attacking Serbian police and military facilities in 
Kosovo). 
 146. Perritt, supra note 141, at 8 (indicating that NATO began its bombing 
campaign “aimed at ending ethnic cleansing and protecting human rights in 
Kosovo”); see also IAIN KING & WHIT MASON, PEACE AT ANY PRICE: HOW THE WORLD 
FAILED KOSOVO 43–45 (2006) (describing the events leading up to the NATO air 
strikes in the former Yugoslavia). 
 147. Hasani, supra note 79, at 320 (noting that the refusal of Serbia to agree to 
the Rambouillet Accords caused the NATO bombing campaign); see also Brown, 
supra note 14, at 240 (noting how the NATO bombing campaign was successful in 
forcing the Yugoslav government to agree to terms of peace). 
 148. See Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, Feb. 23, 
1999, U.N. Doc. S/1999/648 (June 7, 1999), available at http://www.state.gov/www/ 
regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html [hereinafter Rambouillet Accords].  
Moreover, Security Council Resolution 1244 directly references the Rambouillet 
Accords for the purpose of determining Kosovo’s future status.  S.C. Res. 1244, 
¶ 11(e), U.N. SCOR 54th Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999) 
[hereinafter Resolution 1244].  Thus, Resolution 1244 represents the legal 
foundation upon which “the civilian and military branches of the international 
administration in Kosovo are based.”  Hasani, supra note 79, at 323; see Resolution 
1244; see also Gruda, supra note 14, at 356 (noting that Resolution 1244 provides for 
the civil administration of Kosovo).  Under Resolution 1244, Kosovo was occupied by 
a multilateral force (KFOR) and administered by a United Nations Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK). See Hasani, supra note 79, at 323–25 (providing a detailed 
discussion of the U.N. administrative regime over Kosovo under the terms of the 
Rambouillet Agreement). 
 149. Williams, supra note 145, at 415 (describing the political changes in Serbia 
as a result of Milosevic’s removal from office). 
 150. For example, during a recent trip to Serbia, in March 2008, I witnessed a 
peaceful political protest on the streets of Novi Sad, the capital of the northern 
province of Vojvodina, where protesters were carrying banners with signs reading: 
“We have a right to the European future” and “Don’t let Kosovo slow us down.”  This 
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relevant players, including the Serbian leadership, the Kosovar 
representatives, and U.N. and EU representatives, negotiated 
several times, but because of strong differences about the future 
of Kosovo, they were never able to reach consensus.151  In fact, 
Serbia, while pragmatically recognizing the need to 
accommodate western demands,152 maintained its position that 
Kosovo remain a territorial part of Serbia with strong regional 
autonomy.153  Kosovo, on the other hand, insisted that it 
deserved independence.154 
On February 17, 2008, backed by powerful world countries 
like the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, the 
Kosovar Parliament voted on a declaration of independence.155  
In the few days following the Kosovar declaration of 
independence, the United States, as well as about twenty EU 
countries, formally recognized Kosovo as a new state.156  Thus, 
Kosovo illustrates a situation similar to that of East Timor: a 
struggling minority group, seeking self-determination is aided 
by the Great Powers and is ultimately able to achieve 
independence from its central government, in this case, Serbia.  
Without the help of the Great Powers, and precisely, the 
 
demonstrates that a portion of the Serbian population seems aware of the necessity 
to let go of Kosovo in order to have access into Europe. 
 151. Viola Trebicka, Lessons from the Kosovo Status Talks: On Humanitarian 
Intervention and Self-Determination, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 255, 256–58 (2007) 
(describing the so-called status talks on the future of Kosovo and the fact that a 
“brokered political agreement . . . has proven much more elusive than was first 
thought”). 
 152. Timothy Garton Ash, This Dependent Independence is the Least Worst 
Solution for Kosovo, GUARDIAN, Feb. 21, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/ 
2008/feb/21/kosovo (comparing the loss of Kosovo for Serbia as a loss of a 
“gangrenous arm” and concluding that this is a “precondition of recovery”). 
 153. In fact, the day after the Kosovar declaration of independence, the Serbian 
President, Boris Tadic, “appealed to the UN Security Council to declare Kosovo’s 
‘unilateral and illegal’ declaration of independence ‘null and void,’” because Kosovo’s 
separation “violates Security Council Resolution 1244 which reaffirms Serbia’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.”  Ban Ki-moon Urges Restraint by All Sides 
After Kosovo Declares Independence, UNMIK NEWS COVERAGE, Feb. 18, 2008, 
http://www.unmikonline.org/archives/news02_08full.htm. 
 154. Trebicka, supra note 151, at 255 (observing that the Kosovar Albanians 
have demanded their right to self-determination, which would lead to secession). 
 155. See UNMIK NEWS COVERAGE, supra note 153. 
 156. For example, as of February 18, 2008, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France and Belgium had all expressed support for the “new state of 
Kosovo.”  Id.  Note, however, that several states expressed their opposition to the 
Kosovar independence, including Spain, Russia, China, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka.  
Nicholas Kulish & C.J. Chivers, Kosovo is Recognized but Rebuked by Others, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/world/europe/ 
19kosovo.html. 
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military intervention staged by the Great Powers through 
NATO, the Kosovars would not have been able to secede from 
Serbia.157  Moreover, without the political support of the Great 
Powers and the Great Powers’ willingness to recognize Kosovo 
as a new state, the Kosovars would not have been able to assert 
their independence from Serbia as easily as they did in 
February 2009. 
D.  GEORGIA 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia are breakaway provinces 
within the former Soviet republic of Georgia.158  These two 
provinces have functioned as de facto states in recent years, and 
spurred international controversy during the summer of 2008, 
when Russia decided to support the two provinces by sending 
military troops to Georgia.159  The Russian intervention evolved 
into war between Georgia on one side and Russia, South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia on the other.   
In August 2008, when the Georgian armed forces pushed 
into South Ossetia, Russia accused Georgia of genocide, 
claiming that thousands of South Ossetian civilians were killed 
by the Georgian troops.160  In response, Russia sent troops into 
South Ossetia and launched air strikes on Georgian territory.161  
After a few days of heavy fighting, Georgian troops were ejected 
from South Ossetia.162  Meanwhile, the Russian military troops 
 
 157. In fact, in October 2008, the U.N. General Assembly agreed to the request 
of Serbia to have the ICJ legally examine the validity of  the Kosovar secession.  
Kosovo Blunder Goes to Court, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 12, 2008, at K8.  Thus, it will be 
interesting to read the World Court’s legal pronouncement on the case of Kosovo—
whether the World Court offers a legal justification for the separation will be 
indicative of whether the separation was legally versus politically justified. 
 158. See Nikolai Pavlov, Russia, Georgia Seek Control of South Ossetia Capital, 
REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/ 
idUSL768040420080808?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0.  See also 1 
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, INDEP. INT’L FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE 
CONFLICT IN GEOR., at 7, 17 (2009), available at http://www.ceiig.ch. 
 159. See id.; see also 1 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 158, at 13. 
 160. Tom Parfitt, Russia Exaggerating South Ossetian Death Toll, Says Human 
Rights Group, GUARDIAN, Aug. 13, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/ 
13/georgia; see also 1 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 158, at 10, 21. 
 161. See Mikhail Barabanov, The August War Between Russia and Georgia, 
MOSCOW DEFENSE BRIEF, #3, 2008, available at http://www.mdb.cast.ru/mdb/ 
3-2008/item3/article1/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2009); see also 1 COUNCIL OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 158, at 10. 
 162. See Barabanov, supra 161; see also 1 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
supra note 158, at 10–11 (detailing the invasion of South Ossetia by Georgian 
troops, and Russia’s role in stopping the advance of Georgian forces). 
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stationed in Abkhazia began marching into Georgia; this 
advance into Georgia was accompanied by reports of widespread 
looting, burning, and killing of civilians by Ossetian militia.163 
On August 12, the Russian president ordered a halt to Russian 
military operations in Georgia, and a peace plan was brokered 
by the EU which Russia, Georgia, as well as the South Ossetian 
and Abkhazian separatist leaders signed and endorsed.164 
Yet, Russia has refused to withdraw its military troops from 
Georgia.  Russia has also signaled no intention to end its 
military presence in the disputed Georgian regions of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia.165  In fact, on August 25, 2008, Russia 
recognized these as independent states.166  Russia now says that 
its troops stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are guests of 
the newly-born nations, and their status is not regulated by the 
above-mentioned peace plan.167 
Currently, the status of South Ossetia is being negotiated 
between the central government of Georgia and the Russian-
supported separatist government of South Ossetia.168  Recently, 
 
 163. Luke Harding & James Meikle, Georgian Villages Burned and Looted as 
Russian Tanks Advance, GUARDIAN, Aug. 13, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2008/aug/13/georgia.russia6; see also 1 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
supra note 158, at 27 (adding gender-related crime including rape, assault, hostage-
taking, and arbitrary arrests to the list of offenses committed by the Southern 
Ossetians). 
 164. See Andrew E. Kramer, A French-Brokered Peace Offers Russia a Rationale 
to Advance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2008, at A1 (explaining the points of the peace 
deal); Russian President Orders Halt to Military Operations in Georgia, RADIO FREE 
EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/content/ 
Russian_Planes_Renew_Attacks_On_Gori/1190334.html.  But cf. 1 COUNCIL OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 158, at 22 (stating that while a ceasefire was 
brokered, the Russian and South Ossetian forces reportedly continued their 
advances for some days after and occupied additional territories, including the 
Akhalgori district). 
 165. See Kramer, supra note 164. 
 166. See Gregory L. White & John W. Miller, Russia Raises Ante on Separatist 
Georgia Regions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2008, at A9; 1 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, supra note 158,  at 37 (explaining that this assertion by Russia greatly 
hinders the possibility of resolution).  Nicaragua and Venezuela are the only two 
other countries to recognize the states.  Venezuela's Foreign Policy: Dreams of a 
Different World, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2009; Gregory Dubinsky, The Exceptions That 
Disprove the Rule?  The Impact of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on Exceptions to the 
Sovereignty Principle, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 241, 241 (2009). 
 167. See generally Kramer, supra note 164 (stating that Russia is defining the 
continued presence as a peacekeeping measure); 2 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, supra note 158, at 188–89 (expressing the Russian viewpoint that its troops 
in those regions have always been peacekeepers and its action during the conflict 
were simply in self-defense of the peacekeepers). 
 168. See White & Miller, supra note 166, at A11. 
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these negotiations have broken down in light of Russia’s 
decision to reinforce the region militarily and give Russian 
passports to South Ossetians.169  The government of Georgia has 
expressed that it views these moves as attempts by Russia to 
effectively annex the region.170  The Georgian government levels 
the same criticism against Russian involvement in Abkhazia, 
which currently remains a province of Georgia, but which 
operates as a de facto state.171  Most recently, the Georgian 
government has accused Russia of attempting to stage a brief 
military mutiny in Georgia in an effort to thwart NATO military 
exercises in Georgia.172 
Most of the western Great Powers have expressed their 
support of Georgia and have refused to recognize the 
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.173  Even Russia, 
although it officially supports such independence, is rumored to 
in fact want to annex these two regions.174  South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia therefore illustrate examples of unsuccessful self-
determination struggles, where a minority group or a people is 
unsupported by the Great Powers and is thus unable to achieve 
independence.  In fact, the South Ossetian leader has recently 
expressed his frustration at this lack of support by the Great 
Powers, by complaining that his country has not been able to 
become independent, although it has a better legal case for 
independence than Kosovo, which did become independent.175 
V.  APPLICATION OF SELF-DETERMINATION RIGHTS IN 
THE MODERN WORLD 
From the above discussion and case studies, it is clear that 
the right to self-determination for different minority groups or 
 
 169. See Damien McElroy, South Ossetian Police Tell Georgians to Take a 
Russian Passport, or Leave Their Homes, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 30, 2008, at 17. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See, e.g., West Condemns Russia Over Georgia, BBC NEWS, Aug. 26, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7583164.stm. 
 172. See Olesya Vartanyan & Ellen Barry, On Eve of NATO Exercise, Georgia 
Says It Foiled Mutiny, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2009, at A10. 
 173. Most NATO countries would prefer that Georgia remain intact, as they 
have been exploring the possibility of Georgia joining NATO.  See Steven Erlanger, 
NATO Duel Centers on Georgia and Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2008, at A8. 
 174. See id. 
 175. Bush Warns Moscow Over Breakaway Autonomy, CNN.COM, Aug. 25, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/25/russia.vote/index.html (“We have 
more political-legal grounds than Kosovo to have our independence 
recognized . . . .”). 
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peoples varies from region to region.176  While the Timorese and 
the Kosovars were able to fully exercise their rights to the most 
extreme form of self-determination, leading toward remedial 
secession, the Chechens, the South Ossetians, and the 
Abkhazians have been denied such rights.177  Arguably, the 
latter three peoples have been denied any form of self-
determination, and many have asserted that these peoples’ 
rights are routinely oppressed by their mother states.178  What 
does this suggest about the modern-day contours of the right to 
self-determination?  What are the modern-day criteria a people 
must fulfill in order to be able to legitimately gain some degree 
of self-determination? 
I argue that a people must satisfy the following four 
criteria: it has to show that it has been oppressed; that its 
central government is relatively weak; that it has already been 
administered in some form by some international organization; 
and that it has the support of the Great Powers. 
First, the people seeking to exercise its right to self-
determination must prove that they have been subject to 
oppression and have faced harsh human rights abuses and 
violations.  Typically, a people attract global attention only 
when it can demonstrate how horrifically it is being treated and 
how abusive its central government is.  Instances of mild human 
rights violations generally do not attract the same level of 
international political and media scrutiny, and central 
governments that commit minor minority group abuses typically 
go unnoticed.179  Thus, peoples that have managed to showcase 
their struggles have always been able to demonstrate a high 
 
 176. See supra Part IV. 
 177. See supra Part IV. 
 178. On the oppression of Chechnya by its mother-state, Russia, see supra Part 
IV.B.  On the independence struggles of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, see supra Part 
IV.D. 
 179. The suffering of many minority groups has remained isolated, garnering no 
or little support from the international community.  The Rwandan genocide was not 
prevented by the world community.  Kelly, supra note 1, at 381 (mentioning the 
“unchecked genocide in Rwanda”).  The Kurds have been left on their own.  Id. at 
396 (describing the world inaction when the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein used 
chemical weapons against Kurdish people in Iraq in 1988).  In addition to these 
groups’ struggles, there are many other self-determination seeking groups around 
the globe that have been fighting for their cause in relative obscurity.  Examples of 
such groups include the Kashmiris fighting for independence from India, the Basque 
and the Catalan (from Spain), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (from Sri 
Lanka), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (from the Philippines).  See Chaulia, 
supra note 117. 
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level of suffering and a consistent policy of harsh abuse by the 
central government.  Second, the same people must show that 
its central government—the “rogue” regime committing 
abuses—is relatively weak and cannot properly administer the 
people’s province or region.  In fact, none of the peoples across 
the globe that have succeeded in asserting their rights to self-
determination have been governed by strong, powerful 
governments.180  Typically, self-determination seeking groups 
have been able to demonstrate that their central government, 
although claiming that it wants to govern such groups, is really 
militarily, politically, or structurally unable to assert proper 
control.  Many breakaway regions have been marred by civil 
unrest and violence that have further contributed to the idea 
that these peoples or groups, in order to have any kind of civic 
stability, must be allowed to separate.181  Third, the self-
determination seeking people must show that some form of 
international administration of its region has been needed in 
the recent years, and that international authorities have had to 
govern because of the brutality and inefficacy of the central 
government.182  This criterion is linked to the second one: 
peoples seeking self-determination have successfully shown that 
their central governments were weak, causing violence and 
unrest, and that international authorities have needed to step in 
to preserve or reestablish peace.  Thus, international 
organizations and groups have been involved in virtually all 
self-determination seeking regions.183  Finally, the self-
determination-seeking people must prove that external actors, 
including the Great Powers, view its struggle as legitimate and 
are ready to embrace it as a new sovereign partner.  I allege 
that this ultimate criterion is the most important one, and that 
it routinely determines the fate of various peoples struggling for 
the recognition of their rights across the globe. 
 
 180. The Indonesian rule over East Timor had been weakened by the time the 
Timorese asserted their independence rights, and the same was true of the Serbian 
reign over Kosovo.  See supra Parts IV.A, IV.C. 
 181. See supra Parts IV.A, IV.C. 
 182. Audio tape: Panel on International Law, Politics and the Future of Kosovo, 
held by the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting (Apr. 9–12, 
2008), available at http://www.asil.org/events/am08post/selectaudio.html (explaining 
that international administration was a component of Kosovo’s achievement of 
independence). 
 183. East Timor had been guarded by a U.N. force, see East Timor, Birth, supra 
note 114; Kosovo had been administered by a U.N. force called UNMIK, see Sterio, 
supra note 10, at 272. 
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Whether the Great Powers decide to legitimize a people’s 
struggle for self-determination is crucial for the outcome of such 
a struggle.  First, the Great Powers control hugely important 
media outlets and the global access to information.184  If the 
Great Powers decide not to give media coverage to a struggling 
people or region, that people will remain unnoticed on the global 
scene, and its suffering will attract no significant external 
involvement.  Alternatively, its suffering will be downplayed by 
the Great Powers and will be discarded as not warranting true 
intervention.  Second, the Great Powers have, throughout the 
years, provided key military and logistic support to states across 
the globe.  Some central governments have been able to retain 
control over portions of their territories simply because of 
support by the Great Powers.185  Conversely, some central 
governments have lacked such support and have not been able 
to control breakaway regions and popular movements within 
their territories.186  Thus, it is the Great Powers that contribute 
toward the stability, or lack thereof, of central governments 
across our planet.  Third, the Great Powers control the United 
Nations system through their veto powers on the Security 
Council.187  It is only when the Great Powers agree that the 
 
 184. See, e.g., Stephen J. Rapp, Achieving Accountability for the Greatest 
Crimes—the Legacy of the International Tribunals, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 259, 272 (2007) 
(discussing the powerful role of the media in inciting the Rwandan genocide); Robert 
A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 
4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 79, 101 (1998) (discussing the power over national 
media that the U.S. President has in the United States); Joshua D. Reader, Note, 
The Case Against China Establishing International Liability for China’s Response to 
the 2002–2003 SARS Epidemic, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 519, 557 n.253 (2006) 
(discussing the deliberate policy of media control that the Chinese government 
undertakes).  These examples illustrate the important role that the media plays 
domestically and internationally, and the importance of control asserted by powerful 
governments over their national media. 
 185. For example, throughout the Cold War, Indonesia was able to retain control 
over East Timor with the help of some of the Great Powers, namely, the United 
States, Great Britain, and Australia.  Chaulia, supra note 117.  Similarly, Turkey 
has been able to “ward off claims of a separate Kurdistan, thanks to Ankara’s six-
decades-long closeness to Washington.”  Id.  Finally, Israel has been able to ignore 
Palestinian claims for independence for decades, also with “American blessings.”  Id. 
 186. For example, Indonesia has not been able to retain its grip over the East 
Timor province, nor has Serbia been able to do so over Kosovo.  See supra Parts 
IV.A, IV.C.  In both cases, the central governments (Indonesia and Serbia) were 
unaided by the Great Powers and in both cases, the minority groups (the East 
Timorese and the Kosovars) were supported by the Great Powers in their self-
determination quests.  See Chaulia, supra note 117. 
 187. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 394.  While it is true that some Great Powers, 
like Germany, Italy, and Japan, do not have veto power on the Security Council, 
these countries nonetheless have powerful and important allies on the Security 
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Security Council can authorize the deployment of military 
troops, peacekeepers, or international administrators to a 
troubled region.188  Thus, peoples whose struggles are not 
viewed as legitimate by the Great Powers will never be able to 
garner Security Council support for the creation of some form of 
an international administration within their region.189  Finally, 
if peoples are seeking to separate from a Great Power, as in the 
case of Chechnya struggling to gain independence from Russia, 
their quest for self-determination will most likely fail.  Great 
Powers themselves have potent militaries to quash dissent 
within or close to their borders, like in the case of Russia 
intervening in Chechnya and in Georgia, and no other countries 
want to run the risk of offending a Great Power by supporting a 
minority, independence seeking group within the Great Power’s 
territory.  The Great Powers seem to be immune from pressures 
of self-determination, and their borders are unlikely to yield to 
secessionist movements.   
Even the very notion of humanitarian intervention remains 
inextricably linked with approval by the Great Powers.190  
Humanitarian intervention is always organized, structured, 
financed, and led by some of the Great Powers; other countries 
simply do not have enough power, leverage, or resources on the 
international scene to engage in such intervention.  Even 
proponents of the above-described involuntary waiver of 
sovereignty theory acknowledge that it is up to the Great 
Powers to determine when a country has so waived its 
sovereignty.  Haass, when questioned about the issue of who 
decides when a state is committing atrocious actions that would 
trigger intervention, seemed to imply that the United States, 
and possibly the other Great Powers, should decide.191  
 
Council and can exercise significant influence in its deliberations. 
 188. See id. 
 189. Basically, peoples that struggle for independence from strong, powerful 
countries, will not succeed because “[l]arge and powerful countries with stable 
polities such as Russia, China, and India can defend their territorial integrity and 
are unlikely to become candidates for Kosovo-type challenges.”  Chaulia, supra note 
117.  Moreover, peoples that struggle for independence from countries that are 
backed by the Great Powers are also unlikely to succeed.  “States like Israel and 
Turkey are proving that, as long as they enjoy American blessings, they can see 
through secessionism and even undertake cross-border raids on militants 
threatening their sovereignty.”  Id. 
 190. See supra Part III.B. 
 191. Richard N. Haass, Pondering Primacy, 4 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 91, 92–93 
(2003) (“[T]here is no single source of authority or legitimacy. . . . [T]he United 
Nations is not yet at the point where it alone can decide what is legitimate and what 
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According to Haass, the Great Powers should act multilaterally 
to stop genocide, terrorists, and WMD, even outside of the U.N. 
collective security apparatus, and the Great Powers should have 
flexibility (read: decision-making authority) to engage in 
intervention across the globe.192  Thus, it is the Great Powers’ 
support, or lack thereof, toward a people’s struggle for self-
determination that determines the outcome of such a struggle.  
As the above-described case studies demonstrate, all peoples 
that have successfully exercised some form of self-determination 
have been supported by the Great Powers.193  The converse is 
equally true: all peoples that are still living as part of an 
oppressive, central regime have been unable to garner the 
support of the Great Powers.194 
Another important issue that merits discussion is what 
motivation drives the Great Powers in their decision to support, 
or not, a struggling self-determination movement or people.  In 
other words, why were the Great Powers supportive of East 
Timor and Kosovo, and not of Chechnya and the Georgian 
provinces? As I have demonstrated above,195 the Great Powers 
seem intent on helping groups, movements and states when it is 
in their geopolitical interest to do so.  The Great Powers may 
deem that they have a strong regional partner in State X; if that 
is the case, they may help State X government economically, 
politically, and militarily.  Consequently, State X will have a 
strong central government and any opposition and minority 
movements will be severely quashed, with the help of the Great 
Powers.  During the Cold War, this is what took place in 
Indonesia and East Timor: the former was viewed as an 
important political ally to the West against the Soviet bloc, and 
thus received aid as well as financial and military support, and 
East Timor was ignored in its struggle for independence.196  
Similarly, Kosovo may be viewed as an important potential 
 
is not.  Well then, who decides?  Is it the United States or some other government?  
The answer is that you have to look at the case at hand and you have to try to make 
a case in the court of international public opinion. . . . [Y]ou have to base your 
actions on norms.”). 
 192. Kelly, supra note 1, at 409. 
 193. See supra Part IV. 
 194. Examples of such peoples include the Chechens, the South Ossetians and 
the Abkhazians, as well as Tibetans.  See supra Parts IV.B, IV.D; see also Chaulia, 
supra note 117 (describing that Tibet has been ruled and oppressed by China over 
the last 40 years). 
 195. See supra Part IV. 
 196. See supra Part IV.A; see also Chaulia, supra note 117. 
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partner to the West in its opposition to any dangerous Serbian 
expansion; thus, Kosovar independence was favored by the 
Great Powers over Serbian territorial integrity.197 
The Great Powers may also prefer not to offend other Great 
Powers and may choose not to support a struggling group.  In 
the case of Chechnya, the Great Powers chose not to engage in a 
political, diplomatic or military scuffle with Russia and they 
turned a blind eye to the Chechen pleas for independence.198  
The case of the Georgian provinces illustrates the geopolitical 
motivations of the Great Powers as well.  The western Great 
Powers view Georgia as an important ally against Russia and 
have thus opposed independence movements that threaten 
Georgian territorial integrity.  These Great Powers have 
opposed South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence.  Russia, 
on the contrary, has recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
because it dislikes Georgia and would like to strengthen its own 
political and military situation in the Caucuses by embracing 
regional allies like the two breakaway provinces.199  The Great 
Powers conduct affairs on the international scene by focusing on 
their own strategic interests first, and by choosing to support a 
group or not in light of those same interests.  The right to 
external self-determination can be easily placed in this dynamic.  
The Great Powers embrace the principle, but choose to support 
it in real situations only when their own interests are served by 
such exercise of external self-determination by a specific people.   
The right to external self-determination has become 
entrenched in the notion of the rule by the Great Powers, which 
has in turn modified traditional ideas about statehood, 
recognition, sovereignty, and intervention.  As described above, 
an entity seeking to exercise its external self-determination 
rights must prove to the outside actors, and today, the Great 
Powers, that it qualifies as a state.  As described above, because 
the Great Powers are essentially more sovereign than all other 
states, they may engage in interventions across the globe, and 
such interventions may aid an independence-seeking people, or 
may directly impede its struggle for independence.  Thus, the 
Great Powers’ rule has directly affected concepts like statehood, 
recognition, sovereignty, and intervention, and has shaped 
external self-determination struggles in a particularly political 
manner.  In other words, it is only when a people is supported 
 
 197. See supra Part IV.C. 
 198. See supra Part IV.B. 
 199. See supra Part IV.D. 
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politically by the Great Powers that it will manage to acquire 
independence and statehood through the exercise of external 
self-determination.  The legal criteria for external self-
determination have become somewhat mooted by the necessity 
to obtain the political support of the Great Powers for any 
struggling people on our planet.200 
One may wonder about the soundness of this rule by the 
Great Powers.  After all, it can be argued that if several key 
states agree on something or disagree on something, their 
consensus should play a crucial role in the decided issue.201  For 
example, if the most important states on our planet agree that 
Kosovo ought to become independent, perhaps their 
independence is a good solution.  However, I believe that the 
rule by the Great Powers inherently undermines state equality 
and the entire sovereignty-based system of global international 
relations.202  While a decision by the Great Powers may be 
politically appropriate and important for the Great Powers, it 
should not have any bearing on the legality of any potential 
separation.  Thus, I believe that it is unfortunate that the right 
 
 200. A perfect example of this assertion would be the different treatment by the 
world community of the Kosovars versus the Chechens in these respective groups’ 
plights for self-determination.  See Charney, supra note 108, at 458–59 (“While in 
Kosovo the international community essentially endorsed the Albanian Kosovar’s 
claims to self-determination, in Chechnya the reactions were more muted, 
essentially focusing on opposition to the violence used by the Russians against the 
Chechens without reference to their possible right to self-determination, within or 
without Russia.  This distinction may be easily dismissed by experts in international 
relations due to the fact that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) is a relatively 
poor country that was run by a person already indicted by the ICTY for 
international crimes—Slobodan Milosevic—and his supporters.  On the other hand, 
Russia despite its troubles was a significant military power with substantial 
economic resources. . . . Furthermore, it is a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council, holding the veto right.”). 
 201. This is what Haass advocates: a concert of Great Powers, working together 
outside of the confines of the U.N. system, as the world’s policemen.  Kelly, supra 
note 1, at 409. 
 202. For example, scholars have already noted the uneven application of the 
involuntary sovereignty waiver theory, asserting that this theory only applies: 
[T]o states that can physically withstand the intervention (China and 
Russia—which are abusing minority ethnic groups within their borders, or 
North Korea —pursuing WMD) or those states that are on otherwise 
friendly terms with the proposed interveners (Pakistan—pursuing WMD, 
or, although not rising to the level of genocide, Mexico—abusing indigenous 
nationals in Chiapas, and Turkey—repressing its Kurdish population).  
Consequently, the policy only operates against countries such as Serbia, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq that cannot resist American power. 
Kelly, supra note 1, at 413. 
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to self-determination in the modern-day world entails not only 
legal, but also political criteria.  This topic, however, shall 
remain the subject of a future article. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
A people under modern-day international law accrues the 
right to some form of self-determination if it can demonstrate 
that it has been subjected to harsh oppression, that it has a 
relatively weak central government, that some type of 
international administration of its region has already taken 
place, and that it has garnered the support of the most 
sovereign states on our planet, the so-called Great Powers.  It is 
my conclusion that the last criterion tends to be the most 
important one and that it directly influences the outcome of 
most self-determination struggles in the modern world.  In fact, 
recent history demonstrates that self-determination seeking 
groups are able to exercise their independence option only if 
they enjoy the Great Powers’ support.  All of the other criteria 
for self-determination, as I have argued throughout this Article, 
seem to have been absorbed into the question of whether the 
struggling people has succeeded in persuading the Great Powers 
that its cause is worthy of independence.  It is the Great Powers 
that control the outcome of most self-determination struggles in 
today’s world, through their military, political, financial, and 
economic dominance, exercised in international organizations 
and directly through concepts such as humanitarian 
intervention and involuntary sovereignty waiver.  We have thus 
witnessed a return of the Great Powers’ rule.  “Selfistans” will 
be successful in their struggle to become states if the Great 
Powers determine that they are worthy of being treated as 
sovereigns on the world stage. 
Thus, in today’s world, the right to self-determination 
seems to entail a mixture of legal and political criteria, with the 
latter often prevailing over the former.  While I believe that this 
situation, termed the rule by the Great Powers, is inherently at 
odds with the idea of state sovereignty and equality, this 
observation remains to be explored in a future academic 
endeavor. 
